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Abstract 
The first air-launched constellation 
of seven small experimental 
communications satellites into an 
unexpectedly low earth orbit (246 nmi X 
192 nmi) resulted in a set of tough flight 
control demands. In the abbreviated 
demonstration mission the flight 
operations team was challenged in 
rapidly propelling the spacecraft into a 
useful uniform distribution about the orbit 
plane and in maintaining the "stations" 
under adverse conditions. The 
constellation was injected in perfect order 
and began mission operations 
immediately. However, each spacecraft's 
attitude control system coupled with the 
force of heavy atmospheric drag to 
produce variable i'1-plane phase drifts 
that required constant observation and 
correction. The satellite UHF 
transponder payloads were operational 
until splashdown 190 days from launch. 
Initial Deployment 
As part of the DARPA L1GHTSAT 
Program, the UHF transponder-equipped 
near polar orbit constellation of seven 
small 49 pound satellites was designed 
to provide a nearly uniform swath over 
3,000 nautical miles wide for the intended 
392 nmi mean altitude cfrcular orbit. At 
this height the instantaneous satellite 
footprints just overlap providing tactical 
"bent-pipe" communications for up to 
approximately three and one half hours 
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at the equator, increasing with latitude. 
With the single plane constellation this 
communication opportunity is presented 
twice per day. 
A major determinant in the choice 
of seven satellites for the constellation 
was the orbit of nearly 400 nmi (741 km) 
where the mission could last for three or 
more years and station-keeping demands 
would be modest. Computations 
showed that a single thrust parallel or 
anti-parallel to the orbital velocity each 
month for each satellite would confine the-
constellation phase drift to about 100 • 
Thus the phasing would be based on the 
nominal 51.4 0 satellite-to-satellite 
separation with drift from station allowed 
to accumulate up to 10 0 per satellite. 
The cold nitrogen thruster fuel load of 32 
grams at 6,000 PSI would provide more 
than a 30% excess station-keeping 
capacity over three years. 
The satellites were lofted by 
PEGASUS and deployed from the 
launcher carriage shown in Figure 1 so 
as to avoid collisions in the first orbits 
and to facilitate individual MICROSAT 
identifications. Initially, the satellites did 
not possess unique Signatures, and the 
eventual USSPACECOM/NAVSPASUR 
ephemeris elements and resulting tracks 
would not be directly correlated with the 
satellite IDs. 
Figure 1. MICROSATs on the launcher carriage 
assembly attached to PEGASUS. All satellites but 
one were ejected in pairs (in opposite directions) 
to avoid destabilizing the vehicle. 
Therefore, a unique deployment 
plan was devised whereby the satellites 
would be injected into two in-plane 
clusters consisting of four leading and 
three trailing satellites in a specific order 
based upon physics alone. Figure 2 
depicts the deployment viewed from 
space along nadir 25 minutes after 
booster (PIt<) burnout. Notice the initially 
retrograde motions of the satellites that 
soon develop into "forward" and 
"rearward" clusters as shown in Figure 3 
that corresponds to 200 minutes beyond 
booster burnout. The deployment 
sequence consisted of a 40 0 yaw, a 
reciprocal (Le., back-to-back, zero net 
momentum) satellite pair ejection of M4 
and M6 followed by a 2QO second delay 
during which a + 45 0 rotation is 
performed, terminating with the second 
back-to-back ejections of M7 and M5. 
After 200 seconds and a -45 0 rotation 
M3 and M1 are similarly ejected. Finally, 
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after an additional 200 seconds and a 
+ 45 0 rotation the unpaired M2 satellite 
was ejected. The ejection speeds with 
respect to the PEGASUS/carriage were 
approximately 1 ft/sec (FPS). The 
satellite-to-satellite collision probability for 
a CM-to-CM for the deployment was: 
p. = 1.0 for CPA .. 35m; p ... 0.5 for CPA .. 22m; 
p ... 0.25 for CPA .. 17m; p ... 0.06 for 
CPA .. 5m; p. • 0 for CPA < 4m 
where a CPA of one meter or less could 
result in a physical collision. 
.1 
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Figure 2. View toward earth, PEGASUS at center 
of figure showing the MICROSAT tracks up to T = 
25 minutes past the second PIK burnout. The full· 
scale downrange is + 0.5 km with the fuJI-scale 
crossrange of :!:0.25 km. 
Figure 3. VIew at T = 200 minutes with 
downrange scale now :!: 1 a km and track symbols 
every 50 minutes. 
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The two clusters thus formed 
diverge at a rate of about 3.7 km/hr. 
The individual clusters disperse at a rate 
of about 1.2 km/hr. Figure 4 was used 
by USSPACECOM/NAVSPASUR and DSI 
in eventually making the track-to-satellite 
correlations. It shows the expected 
formation and dynamics of the satellite 
clusters. Despite the small size of the 12 
sided truncated cylindrical MICROSATs 
(19 x 7.5 inches), NAVSPASUR resolved 
individual satellites within two days. (See 
Figure 5) 
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Figure 4. Expected early formation of the 
MICROSAT constellation before initial thrusting. 
Achievement of the Constellation 
Due to PEGASUS launch anomaly 
on 17 July 1991. the intended altitude 
was not realized. The actual orbit 
achieved had a mean altitude of 
approximately 217 omi and an 
eccentricity of 0.0073. but with the 
intended 82 0 inclination. New thrust-to-
station calculations were quickly made, 
and each satellite was fired sequentially 
onward toward its intended destination. 
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Figure 5. A MICROSAT showing solar celis-_ 
mounted on top. bottom and sides. The 
protrusions are the omni-dlrectional blade 
antennas which are aligned with the orbit normal. 
The NiCd batteries of 50 Watt-hr capacity deliver 
10 Watts to the digitally controlled UHF FM 
transmitter. The systems could handle voice and 
'clear or encrypted data (up to 4.8 kbps). The 
central processor was a low power 8OC86 
operated by VRTX/C-language software. 
The objectives were dual: first thrust each 
satellite in such a manner as to confirm 
or resolve its identity; and second swiftly 
accelerate the transit to station so that 
the system could be immediately used in 
an optimal manner (Le., without undue 
footprint overlap which would result in a 
user keying up more than one satellite at 
a time). The ephemeris data was 
obtained (usually once per day) and the 
tracking diagram updated. Positive 
identification was achieved for each 
apparent satellite track (initially based on 
presumption) by single satellite thrusting 
which tied the physical track with the 
exact MICROSAT name (10). Figure 6 
shows how this was applied in the case 
of M4 and M7 which were very close and 
possibly not actually resolved on day 12 
when a -2 FPS thrust was applied to M7. 
The departure of this track from its 
previous direction clearly identifies the 
now sharply diverging track. By an 
analysis of the kinetics it turned out that 
the actual thrust was -2.67 FPS. 
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Figure 6. Illustration of track correlation. 
Theoretically M4. M7. M2, M3 comprise the 
forward cluster and here M7 Is given a retro-thrust 
of -2 FPS forcing It into a lower, faster orbit and 
therefore, moves ahead In the formation. 
Due to the low orbit, it was 
decided to bunch the satellite together in 
order to maintain a small footprint 
overlap (Le., 5 - 10%) with a long period 
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of continuous "bent pipe" (i.e., 
transponder) communications and also 
to accept the resulting gap in in-plane 
coverage. Thus, the satellites were 
thrust toward orbital stations separated 
by 38 0 by means of impulses ranging 
between + /-6 FPS generated by the 
on board nitrogen gas thrusters. Multiple 
small thrusts were used where possible 
and the 38 0 stations were generally 
achieved after 60 days with errors of -3 0 
to + 7 0 in orbital phase. 
The speed impulse necessary to 
adjlJst a satellite by a phase shift of y in 
a time T is given by 
1 !MG 0,-1/2 4V.--....J~:......:.., __ _ 
3 TJM,G/y(o,-'Jl2) + 1 
where a is the nominal semi-major axis. 
Substituting a.m .. 3,444 + AL T nmi and 
adjusting for units of /l V in FPS, the 
expression reduces to 
41 y{FPS). 4.0914 x 10 .... x(ALT + 3,444) xy.., 
T..,.. 
For example, to change a satellite's 
phase by 100 0 in 60 days requires a /lV 
of 2.5 FPS assuming an altitude of 217 
nmi. To advance the satellite requires a 
retro thrust. Once the period of T daya is 
reached and the desired station thus 
achieved, a braking impulse of the same 
magnitude is required. This must 
equalize the altitude of the given satellite 
with the mean constellation altitude. 
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Such balance is never possible in LEO 
operations and therefore vigilance is 
required in the provision of essentially 
constant control. Since the orbits are of 
low eccentricity it is not important that the 
impulses be imparted at either perigee or 
apogee. This is not so of major thrusts,· 
Le., where 6. V /VOrbit is not very small. 
Thrust Operations 
MICROSATs are spinners 
equipped with active ACSs as reported in 
reference (1). The satellite spin axis is 
maintained normal to the orbit plane and 
internal magnetic torquers provide both 
precession and spin control. Precession 
was normally held to within the intended 
± 50 limit, a detail of importance due to 
the unexpectedly low orbit as explained 
below. The spin was nicely maintained 
at 3 RPM. In order to fire a thruster the 
attitude dynamics and stability of the 
satellite had to be known and judged 
satisfactory else the thrust would be 
ineffective, somewhat out of plane, and 
potentially in the wrong direction should 
the spin sense be incorrectly interpreted. 
Spin sense was not directly available 
from telemetry but was deduced by a 
comparison of the magnetometer 
telemetry with the results of simulated 
orbit and IGRF geomagnetic field models. 
The nitrogen jet nozzle was 
mounted radially to provide thrust 
orthogonal to the spin axis in the orbit 
plane. Ground control would issue a 
thrust command .to deliver a specified 
impulse to be delivered at a specified 
future time. Onboard, the thruster 
software measured the gas temperature 
and pressure and solved Van der Waals 
equation to obtain the mass of the 
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gaseous nitrogen remaining in the tank. 
"rhe performance of the valves had been 
extensively characterized and a 
parametric description was held in 
computer ROM memory. This permitted 
the shape of each pulse (including the 
impulse associated with the often 
significant pulse tail) to be calculated and 
the thrust centroid to be aligned with the 
+ RAM direction as the satellite rotated. 
An error in spin sense knowledge would 
result in a reciprocal thrust. The thruster 
system therefore determined the proper 
valve orders and synchronized with the 
last nadir crossing time and current spin 
rate as determined by the ACS. Thrusts 
produced by this system on orbit were 
well within expectations based upon pre-
flight laboratory analysis. However, the 
system could not deliver impulses less 
than + 0.86 FPS at maximum gas 
pressure (6,000 PSI). A smaller 
"microthrust" capability would have been 
useful especially if satellite tracking could 
be accomplished more frequently than 
once per day. 
The satellite constellation relative 
phase diagram (Figure 8) was used as 
the primary tool for prediction of drift. 
Due to the low orbit the data obtained at 
the rate of once per day exhibits 
considerable non-linearity and sometimes 
"noise" as well. With the very short 
predicted lifetime of about six months, 
the long gentle slopes associated with 
the intended monthly station-keeping at 
the 400 nmi level were not possible. The 
situation was changing at a rate equal to 
or greater than the incoming ephemeris 
(Le., tracking) data and predictions for 
the long term were impossible. Drag 
levels on the order of 400 times those 
expected coupled with the ACS in a 
unique manner greatly impacting flight 
operations. The M ICROSAT ballistic 
coefficient B = m/ (CcA) for a satellite 
showing no roll/yaw error is 
approximately Bmax = 101.4 Kg/m2• 
Should the satellite yaw or roll 90 
degrees, the coefficient becomes Bmin = 
SO.S Kg/m2, Thus, a MICROSAT 
precessing its spin axis slightly (+ 50) off 
the orbit normal will present an 
intermediate B-value. The effective 
variation raises and lowers the orbit and 
therefore continually affects phasing. 
Figure 7 shows the early history of the 
urear" cluster of satellites (M 1, M5 and 
MS) especially the behavior of MS which 
took longer than the other MICROSATs 
in initial ACS stabilization. As a result of 
ACS activity, this satellite begins to 
descend in orbit thus gradually leaving 
the rear pack as its relative phase 
advances. 
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Figure 7. Tracking data for the rear cluster (M1. 
MS. M6) illustrating the enhanced drag coupling 
effect for M6 due to temporary sluggishness of 
the ACS in aligning the satellite spin axis with the 
orbit normal. 
S 
Thrusting was not attempted until 
satisfactory attitude stability was 
achieved. Due to such unexpected 
effects, several crossovers were 
permitted and the ordering of satellites in 
the constellation was thus modified 
several times during the mission. Figure 
8 shows the first 130 days of flight. The 
ripples in the curves represent actual 
motions of MS at the center of the 
constellation. Intervals of poor 
communications due principally to 
extreme ground interference with our 
antenna near Washington D.C. 
contributed on several occasions to 
undesired satellite drift past the intended 
station. The requirements to have 
accurate smooth track data, a stable 
ACS, and clean communications 
opportunities at the necessary time would 
not have been a problem at 400 nmi._ 
However, with the low orbit, achievement 
of a" three of these objectives became 
increasingly difficult as the short mission 
proceeded. As time progressed and the 
altitude dropped, these effects escalated 
until control became nearly impossible 
due to the extreme drag and ACS 
coupling with it. The thrusts required to 
overcome drag induced de-phasing 
eventually approached the limits of 
control. For example, Figure 9 shows 
M1 about four months into the mission 
when the ACS was shut down for about 
three hours. The resulting re-acquisition 
process was very sluggish due to the 
presence of the tremendous disturbance 
torques. The orbit began to decay at a 
rate of -2.1 nmi/week. The ACS became 
stable only after two weeks when 
thrusting was again enabled. A series of 
five forward thrusts was undertaken in 
order to restore the proper altitude( a pre-
requisite to phase stability) but in this 
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episode the satellite had already moved 
53 0 in relative phase. The drift rate 
between the center of mass and a given 
satellite is governed approximately by 
de 3 iM,G 180 
- e lday) • -- 6a ... x 86,400 x-
tit 2 all2 11: 
.. 
where G is the universal gravitation 
constant, Me is the mass of the earth, 
and anmi is the mean semi-major axis in 
nmi. At 180 nmi, for example, a .. 3,624 
nmi. Thus d9/dt = -2.36Ll~mi' If a 
satellite is one nmi low, then d9/dt = 
+2.36°/day. This is the approximate 
situation depicted in Figure 9 applied to 
an average altitude loss for M 1 of about 
3.5/2 = 1.75 nmi. Thus in two weeks 
this yields 58 0 , in close agreement with 
the measured value of 53 0 • Drag 
induced discrepancies in altitude must 
constantly be corrected in order to 
maintain proper phasing. The capacity 
to both make a proper determination of 
the decay rate and order thrusts required 
time, perhaps two days. The effective 
reaction time is eventually a limiting factor 
in very low altitude orbit control. 
Lacking sufficient fuel to correct 
this large 53 0 phase error (via a sojourn 
to a higher orbit) the original station for 
M 1 was abandoned and two other 
satellites were repositioned to give M1 
another's slot. This altitude restoring 
sequence cost over 11 ft/sec or roughly 
11 months of the initial fuel allocation. 
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Figure S. Constellation history for the first 130 
days of the flight. The spacing was gradually 
reduced as the mean altitude decreased. 
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Figure 9. illustration of criticality of proper ACS 
function in terms of station-keeping and thruster 
fuel consumption. 
Final Assessment 
Figure 10 lists the fuel history for 
each of the MICROSATs over the 190 
days of the quickly decaying orbit. An 
average of 9.6 thrusts were applied to 
each satellite. The thrusts realized were 
generally within about 20% of those 
intended, but the exigency mandated by 
the low orbit necessitated larger pulses 
than otherwise would have been 
undertaken. The optimum procedure to 
correct orbit phasing is to thrust in 
smaller steps thus asymptotically 
approaching the key stopping point. Any 
insufficiency in providing timely and 
accurate stopping thrusts will result in 
overshoot or undershoot with generally 
continuing drift. 
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Figure 10. MICRQSAT actual fuel consumption 
table for the entire mission of 190 days. 
* Approximate· based strictly on pressure. 
Despite the hardships imposed by 
the low orbit, the satellites performed 
their communications missions 
satisfactorily and many "firsts- in LEO 
communication satellite constellation 
operations were accomplished in 190 
days. The flight control function 
encompassed more than 550 scheduling 
operations all carried out on the single 
286 PC-based ground station, which also 
served as the primary graphic display 
terminal for all spacecraft telemetry. 
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Detailed analytic support was carried out 
on a 386 PC utilizing daily ephemeris 
data sent via modem directly from 
NAVSPASUR, Dhalgren together with the 
actual telemetries. All seven satellites 
were mission·functional until splashdown. 
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